


Automatic Verification of Cryptographic Protocols in the Formal Model Automatic Verifier ProVerif

Bruno Blanchet

INRIA, École Normale Supérieure, CNRS
blanchet@di.ens.fr

September 2011

Overview of the protocol verifier ProVerif



1. A variant of the spi-calculus
2. Intuitive presentation of the Horn clause representation
3. The solving algorithm
4. Experimental results
5. Formal translation from the spi-calculus.
6. Extension to correspondences

What is the spi calculus ?

The **spi calculus** is an extension of the pi calculus designed to represent cryptographic protocols.

The **pi calculus** is a process calculus:

- processes **communicate**: they can send and receive messages on channels
- several processes can **execute in parallel**.

In the pi calculus, messages and channels are **names**, that is, atomic values a, b, c, \dots

What is the spi calculus ? (continued)

Example

$$\bar{c}\langle a \rangle \mid c(x).\bar{d}\langle x \rangle$$

The first process sends a on channel c , the second one inputs this message, puts it in variable x and sends x on channel d .

The link with cryptographic protocols is clear:

- Each participant of the protocol is represented by a process
- The messages exchanged by processes are the messages of the protocol.

However, in protocols, messages are not necessarily atomic values.

The names of the pi calculus are replaced by **terms** in the spi calculus.

Syntax of the process calculus

Pi calculus + cryptographic primitives

$M, N ::=$	terms
x, y, z	variable
a, b, c, k, s	name
$f(M_1, \dots, M_n)$	constructor application
$P, Q ::=$	processes
$\overline{M}\langle N \rangle.P$	output
$M(x).P$	input
$\text{let } x = g(M_1, \dots, M_n) \text{ in } P \text{ else } Q$	destructor application
$\text{let } x = M \text{ in } P$	local definition
$\text{if } M = N \text{ then } P \text{ else } Q$	conditional
0	nil process
$P \mid Q$	parallel composition
$!P$	replication
$(\nu a)P$	restriction

Two kinds of operations:

- **Constructors** f are used to build terms

$f(M_1, \dots, M_n)$

- **Destructors** g manipulate terms

let $x = g(M_1, \dots, M_n)$ in P else Q

Destructors are defined by rewrite rules $g(M_1, \dots, M_n) \rightarrow M$.

Examples of constructors and destructors

Shared-key encryption: $\{M\}_N$; one decrypts with the key N

- Constructor: Shared-key encryption $\text{sencrypt}(M, N)$.
- Destructor: Decryption $\text{sdecrypt}(M', N)$

$$\text{sdecrypt}(\text{sencrypt}(x, y), y) \rightarrow x.$$

Perfect encryption assumption: one can decrypt only if one has the key.

Public-key encryption: $\{M\}_{pk}$; one decrypts with the secret key sk

- Constructors: Public-key encryption $\text{pencrypt}(M, N)$.
Public key generation $\text{pk}(N)$.
- Destructor: Decryption $\text{pdecrypt}(M', N)$

$$\text{pdecrypt}(\text{pencrypt}(x, \text{pk}(y)), y) \rightarrow x.$$

Examples of constructors and destructors (continued)

Signature: $\{M\}_{sk}$; one verifies with the public key pk

- Constructor: Signature $\text{sign}(M, N)$.
- Destructors: Signature checking $\text{checksign}(M', N')$

$$\text{checksign}(\text{sign}(x, y), \text{pk}(y)) \rightarrow x.$$

Message extraction $\text{getmess}(M')$

$$\text{getmess}(\text{sign}(x, y)) \rightarrow x.$$

Here, we assume that the signed message $\text{sign}(M, N)$ contains the message M in the clear.

Exercise

Model signatures that do not reveal the signed message.

One-way hash function:

- Constructor: One-way hash function $H(M)$.

Very idealized model of a hash function (essentially corresponds to the random oracle model).

Tuples:

- Constructor: tuple (M_1, \dots, M_n) .
- Destructors: projections $ith(M)$

$$ith((x_1, \dots, x_n)) \rightarrow x_i$$

Tuples are used to represent all kinds of data structures in protocols.

Example: The Denning-Sacco protocol

Message 1. $A \rightarrow B : \{\{k\}_{sk_A}\}_{pk_B} \quad k \text{ fresh}$

Message 2. $B \rightarrow A : \{s\}_k$

$(\nu sk_A)(\nu sk_B) \text{let } pk_A = \text{pk}(sk_A) \text{ in let } pk_B = \text{pk}(sk_B) \text{ in}$
 $\bar{c}\langle pk_A \rangle. \bar{c}\langle pk_B \rangle.$

(A) $! c(x_{pk_B}). (\nu k) \bar{c}\langle \text{pencrypt}(\text{sign}(k, sk_A), x_{pk_B}) \rangle.$
 $c(x). \text{let } s = \text{sdecrypt}(x, k) \text{ in } 0$

(B) $| ! c(y). \text{let } y' = \text{pdecrypt}(y, sk_B) \text{ in}$
 $\text{let } k = \text{checksign}(y', pk_A) \text{ in } \bar{c}\langle \text{sencrypt}(s, k) \rangle$

Exercise: The Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol

Exercise

Model the following protocol:

Message 1. $A \rightarrow B \quad \{N_a, A\}_{pk_B} \quad N_a \text{ fresh}$

Message 2. $B \rightarrow A \quad \{N_a, N_b\}_{pk_A} \quad N_b \text{ fresh}$

Message 3. $A \rightarrow B \quad \{N_b\}_{pk_B}$

The semantics is defined by **reduction** $P \rightarrow P'$: the execution of the process is modeled by transforming it into another process.

Main reduction rule = **communication**

$$\bar{N}\langle M \rangle.Q \mid N(x).P \rightarrow Q \mid P\{M/x\}$$

Example

$$\bar{c}\langle a \rangle \mid c(x).\bar{d}\langle x \rangle \rightarrow \bar{d}\langle a \rangle$$

The communicating processes are not always in the above form, so we need an equivalence relation to prepare the reduction.

Equivalence relation

$$P \mid 0 \equiv P$$

$$P \mid Q \equiv Q \mid P$$

$$(P \mid Q) \mid R \equiv P \mid (Q \mid R)$$

$$(\nu a_1)(\nu a_2)P \equiv (\nu a_2)(\nu a_1)P$$

$$(\nu a)(P \mid Q) \equiv P \mid (\nu a)Q \text{ if } a \notin \text{fn}(P)$$

$$P \equiv Q \Rightarrow P \mid R \equiv Q \mid R$$

$$P \equiv Q \Rightarrow (\nu a)P \equiv (\nu a)Q$$

$$P \equiv P$$

$$Q \equiv P \Rightarrow P \equiv Q$$

$$P \equiv Q, Q \equiv R \Rightarrow P \equiv R$$

Reduction relation

$\overline{N}\langle M \rangle.Q \mid N(x).P \rightarrow Q \mid P\{M/x\}$ (Red I/O)

let $x = g(M_1, \dots, M_n)$ *in* P *else* $Q \rightarrow P\{M'/x\}$
if $g(M_1, \dots, M_n) \rightarrow M'$ (Red Destr 1)

let $x = g(M_1, \dots, M_n)$ *in* P *else* $Q \rightarrow Q$
if there exists no M' such that $g(M_1, \dots, M_n) \rightarrow M'$ (Red Destr 2)

$!P \rightarrow P \mid !P$ (Red Repl)

$P \rightarrow Q \Rightarrow P \mid R \rightarrow Q \mid R$ (Red Par)

$P \rightarrow Q \Rightarrow (\nu a)P \rightarrow (\nu a)Q$ (Red Res)

$P' \equiv P, P \rightarrow Q, Q \equiv Q' \Rightarrow P' \rightarrow Q'$ (Red \equiv)

Example

$c(xpk_A).c(xpk_B).\bar{c}\langle xpk_B \rangle$

| $(\nu sk_A)(\nu sk_B) \text{let } pk_A = pk(sk_A) \text{ in let } pk_B = pk(sk_B) \text{ in}$
 $\bar{c}\langle pk_A \rangle.\bar{c}\langle pk_B \rangle.$

(! $c(x_{pk_B}).(\nu k)\bar{c}\langle \text{pencrypt}(\text{sign}(k, sk_A), x_{pk_B}) \rangle.$
 $c(x).\text{let } s = \text{sdecrypt}(x, k) \text{ in } 0$

| ! $c(y).\text{let } y' = \text{pdecrypt}(y, sk_B) \text{ in}$
 $\text{let } k = \text{checksign}(y', pk_A) \text{ in } \bar{c}\langle \text{sencrypt}(s, k) \rangle)$

Example (2)

\rightarrow^*

$c(xpk_A).c(xpk_B).\bar{c}\langle xpk_B \rangle$

| $(\nu sk_A)(\nu sk_B)\bar{c}\langle pk(sk_A) \rangle.\bar{c}\langle pk(sk_B) \rangle$.

(! $c(x_pk_B).(\nu k)\bar{c}\langle pencrypt(sign(k, sk_A), x_pk_B) \rangle$.
 $c(x).let\ s = sdecrypt(x, k)\ in\ 0$

| ! $c(y).let\ y' = pdecrypt(y, sk_B)\ in$
 $let\ k = checksign(y', pk(sk_A))\ in\ \bar{c}\langle sencrypt(s, k) \rangle$)

Example (3)

$\equiv (\nu sk_A)(\nu sk_B)$

$(\bar{c}\langle pk(sk_A)\rangle).\bar{c}\langle pk(sk_B)\rangle).$

$(\quad ! c(x_{-pk_B}).(\nu k)\bar{c}\langle \text{pencrypt}(\text{sign}(k, sk_A), x_{-pk_B})\rangle).$
 $\quad c(x).\text{let } s = \text{sdecrypt}(x, k) \text{ in } 0$

$| \quad ! c(y).\text{let } y' = \text{pdecrypt}(y, sk_B) \text{ in}$
 $\quad \text{let } k = \text{checksign}(y', pk(sk_A)) \text{ in } \bar{c}\langle \text{sencrypt}(s, k)\rangle)$

$| \quad c(xpk_A).c(xpk_B).\bar{c}\langle xpk_B\rangle)$

Example (4)

$\rightarrow^* (\nu sk_A)(\nu sk_B)$

((! $c(x_{pk_B}).(\nu k)\bar{c}\langle \text{pencrypt}(\text{sign}(k, sk_A), x_{pk_B}) \rangle.$
 $c(x).\text{let } s = \text{sdecrypt}(x, k) \text{ in } 0$

| ! $c(y).\text{let } y' = \text{pdecrypt}(y, sk_B) \text{ in}$
 $\text{let } k = \text{checksign}(y', \text{pk}(sk_A)) \text{ in } \bar{c}\langle \text{sencrypt}(s, k) \rangle$)

| $\bar{c}\langle \text{pk}(sk_B) \rangle$)

Example (5)

$\rightarrow^* (\nu sk_A)(\nu sk_B)$

(((c(x_pk_B).(νk)̄⟨pencrypt(sign(k, sk_A), x_pk_B)⟩.
c(x).let s = sdecrypt(x, k) in 0
| ! c(x_pk_B)...)
| (c(y).let y' = pdecrypt(y, sk_B) in
let k = checksign(y', pk(sk_A)) in ̄⟨sencrypt(s, k)⟩
| ! c(y)...))
| ̄⟨pk(sk_B)⟩)

Example (6)

$$\equiv (\nu sk_A)(\nu sk_B)$$

- ($\bar{c}\langle pk(sk_B) \rangle$
- | $c(x_{-pk_B}).(\nu k)\bar{c}\langle \text{pencrypt}(\text{sign}(k, sk_A), x_{-pk_B}) \rangle.$
 $c(x).\text{let } s = \text{sdecrypt}(x, k) \text{ in } 0$
- | $c(y).\text{let } y' = \text{pdecrypt}(y, sk_B) \text{ in}$
 $\text{let } k = \text{checksign}(y', pk(sk_A)) \text{ in } \bar{c}\langle \text{sencrypt}(s, k) \rangle$
- | $! c(x_{-pk_B}).\dots$
- | $! c(y).\dots$

Example (7)

$\rightarrow (\nu sk_A)(\nu sk_B)$

($(\nu k)\bar{c}\langle \text{pencrypt}(\text{sign}(k, sk_A), \text{pk}(sk_B)) \rangle$).

$c(x).let\ s = \text{sdecrypt}(x, k)\ in\ 0$

| $c(y).let\ y' = \text{pdecrypt}(y, sk_B)\ in$

$let\ k = \text{checksign}(y', \text{pk}(sk_A))\ in\ \bar{c}\langle \text{sencrypt}(s, k) \rangle$

| $! c(x_{pk_B}).\dots$

| $! c(y).\dots$)

Example (8)

$\equiv (\nu sk_A)(\nu sk_B)(\nu k)$

($\bar{c}\langle \text{pencrypt}(\text{sign}(k, sk_A), \text{pk}(sk_B)) \rangle$).

$c(x). \text{let } s = \text{sdecrypt}(x, k) \text{ in } 0$

| $c(y). \text{let } y' = \text{pdecrypt}(y, sk_B) \text{ in}$

$\text{let } k' = \text{checksign}(y', \text{pk}(sk_A)) \text{ in } \bar{c}\langle \text{sencrypt}(s, k') \rangle$)

| $! c(x_{pk_B}). \dots$

| $! c(y). \dots$)

Example (9)

$\rightarrow^* (\nu sk_A)(\nu sk_B)(\nu k)$

($c(x).let\ s = sdecrypt(x, k)\ in\ 0$

| $let\ y' = pdecrypt(pencrypt(sign(k, sk_A), pk(sk_B)), sk_B)\ in$
 $let\ k' = checksign(y', pk(sk_A))\ in\ \bar{c}\langle sencrypt(s, k')\rangle$

| $! c(x_{pk_B}).\dots$

| $! c(y).\dots$)

Example (10)

$$\begin{aligned} &\rightarrow^* (\nu sk_A)(\nu sk_B)(\nu k) \\ &\quad (\quad c(x).let\ s = sdecrypt(x, k)\ in\ 0 \\ &\quad | \quad \bar{c}\langle sencrypt(s, k)\rangle \\ &\quad | \quad !\ c(x_{pk_B}).\dots \\ &\quad | \quad !\ c(y).\dots) \end{aligned}$$

Example (11)

$$\begin{aligned} &\rightarrow^* (\nu sk_A)(\nu sk_B)(\nu k) \\ &\quad (\text{let } s = \text{sdecrypt}(\text{encrypt}(s, k), k) \text{ in } 0 \\ &\quad | \text{! } c(x_{pk_B}).\dots \\ &\quad | \text{! } c(y).\dots) \end{aligned}$$

Another presentation of the semantics

Semantic configurations are \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{P} where

- \mathcal{E} is a set of names
- \mathcal{P} is a multiset of processes

Intuitively, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{P} where $\mathcal{E} = \{a_1, \dots, a_n\}$ and $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \dots, P_m\}$ corresponds to

$$(\nu a_1) \dots (\nu a_n)(P_1 \mid \dots \mid P_m)$$

Initial configuration for P : $\text{fn}(P), \{P\}$.

Another presentation of the semantics: reduction relation

$$\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{P} \cup \{0\} \rightarrow \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{P} \quad (\text{Red Nil})$$

$$\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{P} \cup \{!P\} \rightarrow \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{P} \cup \{P, !P\} \quad (\text{Red Repl})$$

$$\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{P} \cup \{P \mid Q\} \rightarrow \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{P} \cup \{P, Q\} \quad (\text{Red Par})$$

$$\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{P} \cup \{(\nu a)P\} \rightarrow \mathcal{E} \cup \{a'\}, \mathcal{P} \cup \{P\{a'/a\}\} \quad (\text{Red Res})$$

where $a' \notin \mathcal{E}$.

$$\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{P} \cup \{\bar{N}\langle M \rangle.Q, N(x).P\} \rightarrow \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{P} \cup \{Q, P\{M/x\}\} \quad (\text{Red I/O})$$

$$\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{P} \cup \{\text{let } x = g(M_1, \dots, M_n) \text{ in } P \text{ else } Q\} \rightarrow \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{P} \cup \{P\{M'/x\}\} \\ \text{if } g(M_1, \dots, M_n) \rightarrow M' \quad (\text{Red Destr 1})$$

$$\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{P} \cup \{\text{let } x = g(M_1, \dots, M_n) \text{ in } P \text{ else } Q\} \rightarrow \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{P} \cup \{Q\} \\ \text{if there exists no } M' \text{ such that } g(M_1, \dots, M_n) \rightarrow M' \quad (\text{Red Destr 2})$$

Example

$\{c\},$

$\{ \quad c(xpk_A).c(xpk_B).\bar{c}\langle xpk_B \rangle$

| $(\nu sk_A)(\nu sk_B) \text{let } pk_A = \text{pk}(sk_A) \text{ in let } pk_B = \text{pk}(sk_B) \text{ in}$
 $\bar{c}\langle pk_A \rangle.\bar{c}\langle pk_B \rangle.$

($! c(x_pk_B).(\nu k)\bar{c}\langle \text{pencrypt}(\text{sign}(k, sk_A), x_pk_B) \rangle.$
 $c(x).\text{let } s = \text{sdecrypt}(x, k) \text{ in } 0$

| $! c(y).\text{let } y' = \text{pdecrypt}(y, sk_B) \text{ in}$
 $\text{let } k = \text{checksign}(y', pk_A) \text{ in } \bar{c}\langle \text{sencrypt}(s, k) \rangle \rangle \}$

Example (2)

$\rightarrow \{c\},$

$\{ c(xpk_A).c(xpk_B).\bar{c}\langle xpk_B \rangle,$

$(\nu sk_A)(\nu sk_B) \text{let } pk_A = \text{pk}(sk_A) \text{ in let } pk_B = \text{pk}(sk_B) \text{ in}$
 $\bar{c}\langle pk_A \rangle.\bar{c}\langle pk_B \rangle.$

$(\quad ! c(x_pk_B).(\nu k)\bar{c}\langle \text{pencrypt}(\text{sign}(k, sk_A), x_pk_B) \rangle).$
 $\quad c(x).\text{let } s = \text{sdecrypt}(x, k) \text{ in } 0$

$| \quad ! c(y).\text{let } y' = \text{pdecrypt}(y, sk_B) \text{ in}$
 $\quad \text{let } k = \text{checksign}(y', pk_A) \text{ in } \bar{c}\langle \text{sencrypt}(s, k) \rangle \rangle \}$

Example (2)

$\rightarrow \{c\},$

$\{ c(xpk_A).c(xpk_B).\bar{c}\langle xpk_B \rangle,$

$(\nu sk_A)(\nu sk_B) \text{ let } pk_A = \text{pk}(sk_A) \text{ in let } pk_B = \text{pk}(sk_B) \text{ in}$
 $\bar{c}\langle pk_A \rangle.\bar{c}\langle pk_B \rangle.$

$(\quad ! c(x_pk_B).(\nu k)\bar{c}\langle \text{pencrypt}(\text{sign}(k, sk_A), x_pk_B) \rangle).$
 $\quad c(x).\text{let } s = \text{sdecrypt}(x, k) \text{ in } 0$

$| \quad ! c(y).\text{let } y' = \text{pdecrypt}(y, sk_B) \text{ in}$
 $\quad \text{let } k = \text{checksign}(y', pk_A) \text{ in } \bar{c}\langle \text{sencrypt}(s, k) \rangle \rangle \}$

Example (3)

$\rightarrow^* \{c, sk_A, sk_B\},$

$\{ c(xpk_A).c(xpk_B).\bar{c}\langle xpk_B \rangle,$

$let\ pk_A = pk(sk_A)\ in\ let\ pk_B = pk(sk_B)\ in\ \bar{c}\langle pk_A \rangle.\bar{c}\langle pk_B \rangle.$

$(\ !\ c(xpk_B).(\nu k)\bar{c}\langle pencrypt(sign(k, sk_A), xpk_B) \rangle).$

$c(x).let\ s = sdecrypt(x, k)\ in\ 0$

$| \ !\ c(y).let\ y' = pdecrypt(y, sk_B)\ in$

$let\ k = checksign(y', pk_A)\ in\ \bar{c}\langle sencrypt(s, k) \rangle \}$

Example (3)

$\rightarrow^* \{c, sk_A, sk_B\},$

$\{ c(xpk_A).c(xpk_B).\bar{c}\langle xpk_B \rangle,$

let $pk_A = pk(sk_A)$ *in* *let* $pk_B = pk(sk_B)$ *in* $\bar{c}\langle pk_A \rangle.\bar{c}\langle pk_B \rangle.$

$(! c(xpk_B).(\nu k)\bar{c}\langle \text{pencrypt}(\text{sign}(k, sk_A), xpk_B) \rangle).$

$c(x).\textit{let } s = \text{sdecrypt}(x, k) \textit{ in } 0$

$| ! c(y).\textit{let } y' = \text{pdecrypt}(y, sk_B) \textit{ in}$

$\textit{let } k = \text{checksign}(y', pk_A) \textit{ in } \bar{c}\langle \text{sencrypt}(s, k) \rangle \rangle \}$

Example (4)

$\rightarrow^* \{c, sk_A, sk_B\},$

$\{ c(xpk_A).c(xpk_B).\bar{c}\langle xpk_B \rangle,$

$\bar{c}\langle pk(sk_A) \rangle.\bar{c}\langle pk(sk_B) \rangle.$

$(\quad ! c(xpk_B).(\nu k)\bar{c}\langle \text{pencrypt}(\text{sign}(k, sk_A), xpk_B) \rangle.$

$\quad c(x).\text{let } s = \text{sdecrypt}(x, k) \text{ in } 0$

$| \quad ! c(y).\text{let } y' = \text{pdecrypt}(y, sk_B) \text{ in}$

$\quad \text{let } k = \text{checksign}(y', pk(sk_A)) \text{ in } \bar{c}\langle \text{sencrypt}(s, k) \rangle \}$

Example (4)

$\rightarrow^* \{c, sk_A, sk_B\},$

$\{ c(xpk_A).c(xpk_B).\bar{c}\langle xpk_B \rangle,$

$\bar{c}\langle pk(sk_A) \rangle.\bar{c}\langle pk(sk_B) \rangle.$

$(! c(xpk_B).(\nu k)\bar{c}\langle \text{pencrypt}(\text{sign}(k, sk_A), xpk_B) \rangle.$

$c(x).\text{let } s = \text{sdecrypt}(x, k) \text{ in } 0$

$| ! c(y).\text{let } y' = \text{pdecrypt}(y, sk_B) \text{ in}$

$\text{let } k = \text{checksign}(y', pk(sk_A)) \text{ in } \bar{c}\langle \text{sencrypt}(s, k) \rangle \}$

Example (5)

$\rightarrow^* \{c, sk_A, sk_B\},$

$\{ \bar{c}\langle pk(sk_B)\rangle,$

$(\quad ! c(x_{-pk_B}).(\nu k)\bar{c}\langle pencrypt(sign(k, sk_A), x_{-pk_B})\rangle.$
 $\quad c(x).let s = sdecrypt(x, k) in 0$

$| \quad ! c(y).let y' = pdecrypt(y, sk_B) in$
 $\quad let k = checksign(y', pk(sk_A)) in \bar{c}\langle sencrypt(s, k)\rangle\}$

Example (5)

$\rightarrow^* \{c, sk_A, sk_B\},$

$\{ \bar{c}\langle pk(sk_B) \rangle,$

$(\quad ! c(x_pk_B).(\nu k)\bar{c}\langle pencrypt(sign(k, sk_A), x_pk_B) \rangle.$
 $\quad c(x).let s = sdecrypt(x, k) in 0$

$| \quad ! c(y).let y' = pdecrypt(y, sk_B) in$
 $\quad let k = checksign(y', pk(sk_A)) in \bar{c}\langle sencrypt(s, k) \rangle \}$

Example (6)

$\rightarrow \{c, sk_A, sk_B\},$

$\{ \bar{c}\langle pk(sk_B) \rangle,$

$! c(x_{-pk_B}).(\nu k)\bar{c}\langle \text{pencrypt}(\text{sign}(k, sk_A), x_{-pk_B}) \rangle.$

$c(x).\text{let } s = \text{sdecrypt}(x, k) \text{ in } 0,$

$! c(y).\text{let } y' = \text{pdecrypt}(y, sk_B) \text{ in}$

$\text{let } k = \text{checksign}(y', pk(sk_A)) \text{ in } \bar{c}\langle \text{sencrypt}(s, k) \rangle \}$

Example (6)

$\rightarrow \{c, sk_A, sk_B\},$

$\{ \bar{c}\langle pk(sk_B) \rangle,$

$! c(x_{pk_B}).(\nu k)\bar{c}\langle pencrypt(sign(k, sk_A), x_{pk_B}) \rangle.$

$c(x).let s = sdecrypt(x, k) in 0,$

$! c(y).let y' = pdecrypt(y, sk_B) in$

$let k = checksign(y', pk(sk_A)) in \bar{c}\langle sencrypt(s, k) \rangle \}$

Example (7)

$\rightarrow \{c, sk_A, sk_B\},$

$\{ \bar{c}\langle pk(sk_B)\rangle,$

$c(x_{pk_B}).(\nu k)\bar{c}\langle \text{pencrypt}(\text{sign}(k, sk_A), x_{pk_B})\rangle.$

$c(x).\text{let } s = \text{sdecrypt}(x, k) \text{ in } 0,$

$! c(x_{pk_B}).\dots,$

$! c(y).\text{let } y' = \text{pdecrypt}(y, sk_B) \text{ in}$

$\text{let } k = \text{checksign}(y', pk(sk_A)) \text{ in } \bar{c}\langle \text{sencrypt}(s, k)\rangle\}$

Example (7)

$\rightarrow \{c, sk_A, sk_B\},$

$\{ \bar{c}\langle pk(sk_B) \rangle,$

$c(x_{pk_B}).(\nu k)\bar{c}\langle \text{pencrypt}(\text{sign}(k, sk_A), x_{pk_B}) \rangle.$

$c(x).\text{let } s = \text{sdecrypt}(x, k) \text{ in } 0,$

$! c(x_{pk_B}).\dots,$

$! c(y).\text{let } y' = \text{pdecrypt}(y, sk_B) \text{ in}$

$\text{let } k = \text{checksign}(y', pk(sk_A)) \text{ in } \bar{c}\langle \text{sencrypt}(s, k) \rangle \}$

Example (8)

$\rightarrow \{c, sk_A, sk_B\},$

$\{ (\nu k) \bar{c} \langle \text{pencrypt}(\text{sign}(k, sk_A), \text{pk}(sk_B)) \rangle \rangle.$

$c(x). \text{let } s = \text{sdecrypt}(x, k) \text{ in } 0,$

$! c(x - \text{pk}_B) \dots,$

$! c(y). \text{let } y' = \text{pdecrypt}(y, sk_B) \text{ in}$

$\text{let } k = \text{checksign}(y', \text{pk}(sk_A)) \text{ in } \bar{c} \langle \text{sencrypt}(s, k) \rangle \rangle \}$

Example (8)

$\rightarrow \{c, sk_A, sk_B\},$

$\{ (\nu k) \bar{c} \langle \text{pencrypt}(\text{sign}(k, sk_A), \text{pk}(sk_B)) \rangle \rangle.$

$c(x). \text{let } s = \text{sdecrypt}(x, k) \text{ in } 0,$

$! c(x _ \text{pk}_B) \dots,$

$! c(y). \text{let } y' = \text{pdecrypt}(y, sk_B) \text{ in}$

$\text{let } k = \text{checksign}(y', \text{pk}(sk_A)) \text{ in } \bar{c} \langle \text{sencrypt}(s, k) \rangle \rangle \}$

Example (9)

$\rightarrow \{c, sk_A, sk_B, k'\},$

$\{ \bar{c} \langle \text{pencrypt}(\text{sign}(k', sk_A), \text{pk}(sk_B)) \rangle \rangle.$

$c(x). \text{let } s = \text{sdecrypt}(x, k') \text{ in } 0,$

$! c(x_{-pk_B}). \dots,$

$! c(y). \text{let } y' = \text{pdecrypt}(y, sk_B) \text{ in}$

$\text{let } k = \text{checksign}(y', \text{pk}(sk_A)) \text{ in } \bar{c} \langle \text{sencrypt}(s, k) \rangle \rangle \}$

Example (9)

$\rightarrow \{c, sk_A, sk_B, k'\},$

$\{ \bar{c} \langle \text{pencrypt}(\text{sign}(k', sk_A), pk(sk_B)) \rangle \cdot$

$c(x). \text{let } s = \text{sdecrypt}(x, k') \text{ in } 0,$

$! c(x_{-pk_B}). \dots,$

$! c(y). \text{let } y' = \text{pdecrypt}(y, sk_B) \text{ in}$

$\text{let } k = \text{checksign}(y', pk(sk_A)) \text{ in } \bar{c} \langle \text{sencrypt}(s, k) \rangle \rangle \}$

Example (10)

$\rightarrow^* \{c, sk_A, sk_B, k'\},$

$\{ \quad c(x).let \ s = sdecrypt(x, k') \ in \ 0,$

$\quad ! \ c(x_pk_B). \dots,$

$\quad let \ y' = pdecrypt(pencrypt(sign(k', sk_A), pk(sk_B)), sk_B) \ in$

$\quad let \ k = checksign(y', pk(sk_A)) \ in \ \bar{c}\langle sencrypt(s, k) \rangle$

$\quad ! \ c(y). \dots \}$

Example (10)

$\rightarrow^* \{c, sk_A, sk_B, k'\},$

$\{ \quad c(x).let \ s = sdecrypt(x, k') \ in \ 0,$

$\quad ! \ c(x_pk_B).\dots,$

$\quad let \ y' = pdecrypt(pencrypt(sign(k', sk_A), pk(sk_B)), sk_B) \ in$

$\quad let \ k = checksign(y', pk(sk_A)) \ in \ \bar{c}\langle sencrypt(s, k)\rangle)$

$\quad ! \ c(y).\dots\}$

Example (11)

$$\begin{aligned} &\rightarrow^* \{c, sk_A, sk_B, k'\}, \\ &\{ \quad c(x).let \ s = sdecrypt(x, k') \text{ in } 0, \\ &\quad ! c(x_{pk_B}).\dots, \\ &\quad \bar{c}\langle sencrypt(s, k') \rangle \\ &\quad ! c(y).\dots \} \end{aligned}$$

Example (11)

$$\begin{aligned} &\rightarrow^* \{c, sk_A, sk_B, k'\}, \\ &\quad \{ \text{c}(x). \text{let } s = \text{sdecrypt}(x, k') \text{ in } 0, \\ &\quad \quad ! c(x_{pk_B}). \dots, \\ &\quad \quad \bar{c}\langle \text{sencrypt}(s, k') \rangle \\ &\quad \quad ! c(y). \dots \} \end{aligned}$$

Example (12)

$$\rightarrow \{c, sk_A, sk_B, k'\},$$
$$\{ \text{let } s = \text{sdecrypt}(\text{sencrypt}(s, k'), k') \text{ in } 0,$$
$$\quad ! c(x_pk_B)\dots,$$
$$\quad ! c(y)\dots \}$$

Example (12)

$\rightarrow \{c, sk_A, sk_B, k'\},$
 $\{ \text{let } s = \text{sdecrypt}(\text{sencrypt}(s, k'), k') \text{ in } 0,$
 $\quad ! c(x_pk_B) \dots,$
 $\quad ! c(y) \dots \}$

Comparison between the two semantics

The first semantics

- is more **standard** (comes from the original semantics of the pi calculus)
- makes it easier to add a **context** around an existing process (see definition of process equivalence)

The second semantics

- directs the reduction more precisely
- makes a **minimal use of renaming** (for restrictions only)

Except when mentioned explicitly, I will rely on the second semantics.

The protocol is executed in parallel with an adversary.

The adversary can be **any process**.

S = finite set of names (initial knowledge of the adversary).

Definition

The closed process Q is an **S -adversary** $\Leftrightarrow \text{fn}(Q) \subseteq S$.

Intuitive definition

The secret M cannot be output on a public channel

Definition

A trace $\mathcal{T} = \mathcal{E}_0, \mathcal{P}_0 \rightarrow^* \mathcal{E}', \mathcal{P}'$ **outputs** M if and only if \mathcal{T} contains a reduction $\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{P} \cup \{ \bar{c}\langle M \rangle.Q, c(x).P \} \rightarrow \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{P} \cup \{ Q, P\{M/x\} \}$ for some \mathcal{E} , \mathcal{P} , x , P , Q , and $c \in S$.

Definition

The closed process P **preserves the secrecy** of M from $S \Leftrightarrow$
 $\forall S$ -adversary Q , $\forall \mathcal{T} = \text{fn}(P) \cup S, \{P, Q\} \rightarrow^* \mathcal{E}', \mathcal{P}'$, \mathcal{T} does not output M .

Several variants of the spi calculus

- Presented variant [Abadi, Blanchet, POPL'02 and JACM'05]
- The **spi-calculus** [Abadi, Gordon, I&C, 1999]
- The **applied pi calculus** [Abadi, Fournet, POPL'01]
Very powerful, thanks to equational theories
- A calculus for **asymmetric communication**
[Abadi, Blanchet, FoSSaCS'01 and TCS'03]

1. A variant of the spi-calculus
2. Intuitive presentation of the Horn clause representation
3. The solving algorithm
4. Experimental results
5. Formal translation from the spi-calculus.
6. Extension to correspondences

ProVerif is a verifier for cryptographic protocols

- Fully automatic
- For an unbounded number of sessions and an unbounded message size
 - Undecidable problem \Rightarrow need for abstractions
- Handles many cryptographic primitives
- Proves various properties: secrecy, correspondences, equivalences
- Efficient

Two ideas (extending [Weidenbach, CADE'99]):

- a **simple abstract representation** of these protocols, by a set of Horn clauses;
- an **efficient solving algorithm** to find which facts can be derived from these clauses.

Using this, we can prove **secrecy** properties of protocols, or exhibit attacks showing why a message is not secret.

We handle in particular shared- and public-key cryptography, hash functions, Diffie-Hellman key agreements.

- Messages \rightsquigarrow terms

$$M ::= x \mid f(M_1, \dots, M_n) \mid k[M_1, \dots, M_n]$$

$\text{pencrypt}(c_0, \text{pk}(sk_A)).$

- Properties \rightsquigarrow facts

$$F ::= \text{attacker}(M).$$

- Protocol, attacker \rightsquigarrow Horn clauses

$$F_1 \wedge \dots \wedge F_n \Rightarrow F$$
$$\text{attacker}(m) \wedge \text{attacker}(pk) \Rightarrow \text{attacker}(\text{pencrypt}(m, pk)).$$

Public-key encryption:

- Encryption $\text{pencrypt}(m, pk)$.
 $\text{attacker}(m) \wedge \text{attacker}(pk) \Rightarrow \text{attacker}(\text{pencrypt}(m, pk))$
- Public key generation $\text{pk}(sk)$.
(builds a public key from a secret key)
 $\text{attacker}(sk) \Rightarrow \text{attacker}(\text{pk}(sk))$
- Decryption $\text{pdecrypt}(\text{pencrypt}(m, \text{pk}(sk)), sk) \rightarrow m$.
 $\text{attacker}(\text{pencrypt}(m, \text{pk}(sk))) \wedge \text{attacker}(sk) \Rightarrow \text{attacker}(m)$

General treatment of primitives

- **Constructors** $f(M_1, \dots, M_n)$
 $\text{attacker}(x_1) \wedge \dots \wedge \text{attacker}(x_n) \Rightarrow \text{attacker}(f(x_1, \dots, x_n))$
- **Destructors** $g(M_1, \dots, M_n) \rightarrow M$
 $\text{attacker}(M_1) \wedge \dots \wedge \text{attacker}(M_n) \Rightarrow \text{attacker}(M)$

(There may be several rewrite rules defining a function.)

Exercise

Give clauses for shared-key encryption and signatures

Clauses that represent the initial knowledge of the adversary:

$$\text{attacker}(M)$$

if the adversary knows M .

Example

For the Denning-Sacco protocol:

$$\text{attacker}(\text{pk}(sk_A))$$
$$\text{attacker}(\text{pk}(sk_B))$$

Normally, fresh names are created each time the protocol is run. Here, we only distinguish two names when they are created after receiving different messages.

Each name k becomes a **function** of the messages previously received:

$$k[M_1, \dots, M_n].$$

(Skolemisation)

These functions can only be applied by the principal that creates the name, not by the attacker.

The attacker can create his own fresh names: $\text{attacker}(b[])$.

Denning-Sacco protocol

- $A \rightarrow B : \{\{k\}_{sk_A}\}_{pk_B} \quad k \text{ fresh}$

A talks with any principal represented by its public key $pk(x)$.

A sends to it the message $\{\{k\}_{sk_A}\}_{pk(x)}$.

$attacker(pk(x)) \Rightarrow attacker(pencrypt(sign(k[pk(x)], sk_A[]), pk(x)))$.

- $B \rightarrow A : \{s\}_k$

B has received a message $\{\{y\}_{sk_A}\}_{pk_B}$.

B sends $\{s\}_y$.

$attacker(pencrypt(sign(y, sk_A[]), pk(sk_B[]))) \Rightarrow$
 $attacker(sencrypt(s, y))$.

General coding of a protocol

If a principal A has received the messages M_1, \dots, M_n and sends the message M ,

$$\text{attacker}(M_1) \wedge \dots \wedge \text{attacker}(M_n) \Rightarrow \text{attacker}(M).$$

Exercise

Model the Needham-Shroeder public key protocol protocol:

Message 1. $A \rightarrow B \quad \{N_a, A\}_{pk_B} \quad N_a \text{ fresh}$

Message 2. $B \rightarrow A \quad \{N_a, N_b\}_{pk_A} \quad N_b \text{ fresh}$

Message 3. $A \rightarrow B \quad \{N_b\}_{pk_B}$

- The **freshness** of nonces is partially modeled.
- The **number of times** a message appears is ignored, only the fact that it has appeared is taken into account.
- The **state** of the principals is not fully modeled.

These approximations are keys for an efficient verification.

Solve the state space explosion problem.

No limit on the number of runs of the protocols.

⇒ essential for the **certification** of protocols.

Approximations: a more formal view

We can show formally by abstract interpretation that, with respect to the multiset rewriting model, the **only approximation** is that the **number of repetitions** of actions is ignored [Blanchet, IPL, 2005].

- Multiset rewriting \Leftrightarrow linear logic
- After approximation: classical logic
- The modeling of names by skolemisation does not introduce an approximation in classical logic.

Typical situation in which the proof fails:
a protocol first needs to keep some data secret,
and later reveals it.

Secrecy criterion

If $\text{attacker}(M)$ cannot be derived from the clauses, then M is secret.

The term M cannot be built by an attacker.

The solving algorithm will determine whether a given fact can be derived from the clauses.

1. A variant of the spi-calculus
2. Intuitive presentation of the Horn clause representation
3. The solving algorithm
4. Experimental results
5. Formal translation from the spi-calculus.
6. Extension to correspondences

Which resolution algorithm

A standard Prolog system would **not terminate**:

$$\text{attacker}(\text{sencrypt}(x, y)) \wedge \text{attacker}(y) \Rightarrow \text{attacker}(x)$$

generates bigger and bigger facts by SLD-resolution.

We need a different resolution strategy.

Completion of the clause base, by **resolution with free selection**.

Selection function $sel(F_1 \wedge \dots \wedge F_n \Rightarrow F) \in \{F_1, \dots, F_n, F\}$.

$$sel(F_1 \wedge \dots \wedge F_n \Rightarrow F) = \begin{cases} F & \text{if } \forall i \in \{1, \dots, n\}, F_i = \text{attacker}(x) \\ F_i & \text{different from attacker}(x), \\ & \text{of maximal size, otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Saturation (2)

$$\frac{R = F_1 \wedge \dots \wedge F_n \Rightarrow F \quad R' = F'_1 \wedge \dots \wedge F'_{n'} \Rightarrow F'}{\sigma F_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \sigma F_n \wedge \sigma F'_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \sigma F'_{n'} \Rightarrow \sigma F'}$$

where σ is the most general unifier of F and F'_1 ,
 $sel(R) = F$, and $sel(R') = F'_1$.

Starting from an initial set of clauses \mathcal{R}_0 ,
perform this resolution step until a fixed point is reached,
eliminating subsumed clauses: $H \Rightarrow C$ subsumes $H' \Rightarrow C'$ when there
exists σ such that $\sigma H \subseteq H'$ (multiset inclusion) and $\sigma C = C'$.

$\text{saturate}(\mathcal{R}_0)$ is the set of obtained clauses R such that $sel(R)$ is the
conclusion of R .

Saturation (3)

Example of a step:

$$\frac{\begin{array}{l} \text{attacker}(x) \wedge \text{attacker}(y) \Rightarrow \text{attacker}(\text{pencrypt}(x, y)) \\ \text{attacker}(\text{pencrypt}(\text{sign}(z, sk_A[]), \text{pk}(sk_B[]))) \Rightarrow \text{attacker}(\text{sencrypt}(s, z)) \end{array}}{\text{attacker}(\text{sign}(z, sk_A[])) \wedge \text{attacker}(\text{pk}(sk_B[])) \Rightarrow \text{attacker}(\text{sencrypt}(s, z))}$$

Theorem

*The clauses obtained after saturation saturate(\mathcal{R}_0) prove the **same facts** as the starting clauses \mathcal{R}_0 .*

Proof (1): some notations

If $R = H \Rightarrow C$, $R' = F_0 \wedge H' \Rightarrow C'$, and σ is the most general unifier of C and F_0 , then $R \circ_{F_0} R' = \sigma H \wedge \sigma H' \Rightarrow \sigma C'$.

If R subsumes R' , $R \sqsupseteq R'$.

\mathcal{R}_0 : initial set of clauses.

\mathcal{R}_1 : set of clauses when the fixpoint is reached.

$\mathcal{R}_2 = \text{saturate}(\mathcal{R}_0) = \{H \Rightarrow C \in \mathcal{R}_1 \mid \text{sel}(H \Rightarrow C) = C\}$

Definition (Derivation)


Let F be a closed fact. Let \mathcal{R} be a set of clauses. A derivation of F from \mathcal{R} is a finite tree defined as follows:

- 1 Its nodes (except the root) are labeled by clauses $R \in \mathcal{R}$.
- 2 Its edges are labeled by closed facts. (Edges go from a node to each of its sons.)
- 3 If the tree contains a node labeled by R with one incoming edge labeled by F_0 and n outgoing edges labeled by F_1, \dots, F_n , then $R \sqsupseteq \{F_1, \dots, F_n\} \Rightarrow F_0$.
- 4 The root has one outgoing edge, labeled by F . The unique son of the root is named the *subroot*.

Proof (3): resolution step

Lemma (Resolution)

Consider a derivation containing a node η' , labeled R' . Let F_0 be a hypothesis of R' . Then there exists a son η of η' , labeled R , such that the edge $\eta' \rightarrow \eta$ is labeled by an instance of F_0 , $R \circ_{F_0} R'$ is defined, and one obtains a derivation of the same fact by replacing the nodes η and η' with a node η'' labeled $R'' = R \circ_{F_0} R'$.



Lemma (Subsumption)

If a node η of a derivation D is labeled by R , then one obtains a derivation D' of the same fact as D by relabeling η with a clause R' such that $R' \sqsupseteq R$.

By transitivity of \sqsupseteq .

Lemma (Saturation)

\mathcal{R}_1 satisfies the following properties:

- 1 For all $R \in \mathcal{R}_0$, there exists $R' \in \mathcal{R}_1$ such that $R' \sqsupseteq R$;
- 2 Let $R = H \Rightarrow C, R' = H' \Rightarrow C' \in \mathcal{R}_1$. Assume that $\text{sel}(R) = C$, $\text{sel}(R') = F_0$, and $R \circ_{F_0} R'$ is defined. In this case, there exists $R'' \in \mathcal{R}_1, R'' \sqsupseteq R \circ_{F_0} R'$.

- 1 A clause is removed only when it is subsumed by another one.
- 2 The fixpoint is reached.

Proof (6): If F is derivable from \mathcal{R}_0 , then F is derivable from $\text{saturnate}(\mathcal{R}_0)$.

Consider a derivation of F from \mathcal{R}_0 .

For each $R \in \mathcal{R}_0$, there exists $R' \in \mathcal{R}_1$ such that $R' \sqsupseteq R$ (Lemma saturation, Property 1).

We relabel each node labeled by $R \in \mathcal{R}_0 \setminus \mathcal{R}_1$ with $R' \in \mathcal{R}_1$ such that $R' \sqsupseteq R$ (by Lemma subsumption).

Therefore, we obtain a derivation D of F from \mathcal{R}_1 .

Next, we build a derivation of F from \mathcal{R}_2 , by transforming D .

Proof (7): If F is derivable from \mathcal{R}_0 , then F is derivable from $\text{saturate}(\mathcal{R}_0)$ (continued).

If D contains a clause not in \mathcal{R}_2 , we transform D as follows.

Let η' be a lowest node of D labeled by a clause not in \mathcal{R}_2 . All sons of η' are labeled by elements of \mathcal{R}_2 .

Let R' be the clause labeling η' . Since $R' \notin \mathcal{R}_2$, $\text{sel}(R') = F_0$ is a hypothesis of R' .

By Lemma resolution, there exists a son of η of η' labeled by R , such that $R \circ_{F_0} R'$ is defined. Since all sons of η' are labeled by elements of \mathcal{R}_2 , $R \in \mathcal{R}_2$. Hence $\text{sel}(R)$ is the conclusion of R . So, by Lemma saturation, Property 2, there exists $R'' \in \mathcal{R}_1$ such that $R'' \sqsupseteq R \circ_{F_0} R'$.

By Lemma resolution, we replace η and η' with η'' labeled by $R \circ_{F_0} R'$.

By Lemma subsumption, we replace $R \circ_{F_0} R'$ with R'' .

The total number of nodes strictly decreases since η and η' are replaced with a single node η'' . Hence, this replacement process terminates.

Upon termination, we obtain a derivation of F from \mathcal{R}_2 .

Why it works

The facts $\text{attacker}(x)$ unify with all facts $\text{attacker}(M)$.

If we allow resolution on facts $\text{attacker}(x)$, we will create many clauses.

The choice of the selection function implies that we **avoid performing resolution upon $\text{attacker}(x)$** .

⇒ This is key to obtaining **termination** in most cases.

Let F be a closed fact.

- 1 Add the clause $F \Rightarrow \text{bad}$: $\mathcal{R}'_0 = \mathcal{R}_0 \cup \{F \Rightarrow \text{bad}\}$.
- 2 Let $\text{deriv}_{\mathcal{R}_0}(F)$ be true if and only if $\text{saturate}(\mathcal{R}'_0)$ contains a clause $H \Rightarrow \text{bad}$ for some H .

If F is derivable from \mathcal{R}_0 then
bad is derivable from \mathcal{R}'_0 then
bad is derivable from $\text{saturate}(\mathcal{R}'_0)$ (previous theorem) then
 $\text{deriv}_{\mathcal{R}_0}(F)$ is true.

If $\text{deriv}_{\mathcal{R}_0}(F)$ is false, then F is not derivable from \mathcal{R}_0 .

Technique similar to the ordered resolution with selection
[Weidenbach, CADE'99].

- Elimination of tautologies
- Elimination of duplicate hypotheses
- Elimination of hypotheses $\text{attacker}(x)$ when x does not appear elsewhere.
- Tuples
- Secrecy assumptions: use conjectures to prune the search space.

The saturation algorithm does not always terminate,
but we have proved that it **terminates** for **tagged protocols**

That is, when each encryption, signature, ... is distinguished from others
by a constant tag c_i

$$\{c_i, M_1, \dots, M_n\}_K$$

- Large class of protocols
- Easy to add tags
- Good design practice

[Blanchet, Podelski, Fossacs'03]

Enforcing termination for all cases

Termination can be enforced by **additional approximations**.

Example: approximate clauses with clauses in decidable class \mathcal{H}_1 .
[Nielson, Nielson, Seidel, SAS'02; Goubault-Larrecq, JFLA'04]

$\mathcal{H}_1 =$ clauses whose conclusion is $P(f(x_1, \dots, x_n))$, with distinct variables x_1, \dots, x_n .

$$\frac{H \Rightarrow P(f(p_1, \dots, p_n)) \quad p_1, \dots, p_n \text{ are not all variables}}{Q_1(x_1), \dots, Q_n(x_n) \Rightarrow P(f(x_1, \dots, x_n)) \quad H \Rightarrow Q_i(p_i)}$$

$$\frac{H \Rightarrow P(f(x_1, \dots, x_i, \dots, x_i, \dots, x_n))}{H, H\{x/x_i\} \Rightarrow P(f(x_1, \dots, x_i, \dots, x, \dots, x_n))}$$

- Ordered resolution with factorization and splitting
[Comon, Cortier, 2003]
Terminates on clauses with at most **one variable**.
Protocols which blindly copy at most one term.
- Decision procedure for a class of **tagged** protocols
without blind copies.
[Ramanujam, Suresh, 2003]

1. A variant of the spi-calculus
2. Intuitive presentation of the Horn clause representation
3. The solving algorithm
4. Experimental results
5. Formal translation from the spi-calculus.
6. Extension to correspondences

Experimental results

Pentium III, 1 GHz.

Protocol	Result	ms
Needham-Schroeder public key	Attack [Lowe]	10
Needham-Schroeder public key corrected	Secure	7
Needham-Schroeder shared key	Attack [Denning]	52
Needham-Schroeder shared key corrected	Secure	109
Denning-Sacco	Attack [AN]	6
Denning-Sacco corrected	Secure	7
Otway-Rees	Secure	10
Otway-Rees, variant of Paulson98	Attack [Paulson]	12
Yahalom	Secure	10
Simpler Yahalom	Secure	11
Main mode of Skeme	Secure	23

1. A variant of the spi-calculus
2. Intuitive presentation of the Horn clause representation
3. The solving algorithm
4. Experimental results
5. Formal translation from the spi-calculus.
6. Extension to correspondences

Translation $\pi + \text{crypto} \rightarrow \text{Horn clauses}$

We consider a protocol P_0 , executed in the presence of an S -adversary.

A protocol is translated into a set of **Horn clauses** using 2 predicates:

- attacker(p)** the adversary may have p
- mess(p, p')** the message p' may be sent on the channel p

Translation: attacker clauses

For each $a \in S$, $\text{attacker}(a[])$ (Init)

$\text{attacker}(b[])$ where b does not occur in P_0 (Name gen)

For each constructor f of arity n ,
 $\text{attacker}(x_1) \wedge \dots \wedge \text{attacker}(x_n) \Rightarrow \text{attacker}(f(x_1, \dots, x_n))$ (Constr)

For each destructor g , for each rewrite rule $g(M_1, \dots, M_n) \rightarrow M$,
 $\text{attacker}(M_1) \wedge \dots \wedge \text{attacker}(M_n) \Rightarrow \text{attacker}(M)$ (Destr)

$\text{mess}(x, y) \wedge \text{attacker}(x) \Rightarrow \text{attacker}(y)$ (Listen)

$\text{attacker}(x) \wedge \text{attacker}(y) \Rightarrow \text{mess}(x, y)$ (Send)

Translation: protocol clauses

ρ : environment (variables, names \mapsto patterns)

h : hypothesis (messages that must be received before reaching the current process)

- $\llbracket 0 \rrbracket \rho h = \emptyset$,
- $\llbracket P \mid Q \rrbracket \rho h = \llbracket P \rrbracket \rho h \cup \llbracket Q \rrbracket \rho h$,
- $\llbracket !P \rrbracket \rho h = \llbracket P \rrbracket \rho h$
- $\llbracket (\nu a)P \rrbracket \rho h = \llbracket P \rrbracket (\rho[a \mapsto a[p_1, \dots, p_n]])h$
when $h = \text{mess}(c_1, p_1) \wedge \dots \wedge \text{mess}(c_n, p_n)$.

Translation: protocol clauses (continued)

- $\llbracket M(x).P \rrbracket \rho h = \llbracket P \rrbracket (\rho[x \mapsto x'])(h \wedge \text{mess}(\rho(M), x'))$
 x' new variable
- $\llbracket \overline{M} \langle N \rangle . P \rrbracket \rho h = \llbracket P \rrbracket \rho h \cup \{h \Rightarrow \text{mess}(\rho(M), \rho(N))\}$
- $\llbracket \text{if } M = N \text{ then } P \text{ else } Q \rrbracket \rho h = \llbracket P \rrbracket (\sigma\rho)(\sigma h) \cup \llbracket Q \rrbracket \rho h$
where σ is the most general unifier of $\rho(M)$ and $\rho(N)$.
- $\llbracket \text{let } x = g(M_1, \dots, M_n) \text{ in } P \text{ else } Q \rrbracket \rho h =$
 $\cup \{ \llbracket P \rrbracket ((\sigma\rho)[x \mapsto \sigma'p']) (\sigma h) \mid g(p'_1, \dots, p'_n) \rightarrow p' \text{ is a rewrite rule of } g$
and (σ, σ') is a most general pair of substitutions such that
 $\sigma\rho(M_1) = \sigma'p'_1, \dots, \sigma\rho(M_n) = \sigma'p'_n \} \cup \llbracket Q \rrbracket \rho h.$

Example: Denning-Sacco protocol

Message 1. $A \rightarrow B : \{\{k\}_{sk_A}\}_{pk_B} \quad k \text{ fresh}$

Message 2. $B \rightarrow A : \{s\}_k$

$(\nu sk_A)(\nu sk_B) \text{let } pk_A = \text{pk}(sk_A) \text{ in let } pk_B = \text{pk}(sk_B) \text{ in}$
 $\bar{c}\langle pk_A \rangle. \bar{c}\langle pk_B \rangle.$

(A) $! c(x_{pk_B}). (\nu k) \bar{c}\langle \text{pencrypt}(\text{sign}(k, sk_A), x_{pk_B}) \rangle.$
 $c(x). \text{let } s = \text{sdecrypt}(x, k) \text{ in } 0$

(B) $| ! c(y). \text{let } y' = \text{pdecrypt}(y, sk_B) \text{ in}$
 $\text{let } k = \text{checksign}(y', pk_A) \text{ in } \bar{c}\langle \text{sencrypt}(s, k) \rangle$

Example: protocol clauses

$$P_0 = (\nu sk_A)(\nu sk_B) \text{let } pk_A = pk(sk_A) \text{ in let } pk_B = pk(sk_B) \text{ in} \\ \bar{c}\langle pk_A \rangle. \bar{c}\langle pk_B \rangle. (!P_A \mid !P_B)$$
$$\llbracket P_0 \rrbracket \{c \mapsto c[]\} \emptyset$$

Example: protocol clauses

$$P_0 = (\nu sk_A)(\nu sk_B) \text{let } pk_A = pk(sk_A) \text{ in let } pk_B = pk(sk_B) \text{ in} \\ \bar{c}\langle pk_A \rangle. \bar{c}\langle pk_B \rangle. (!P_A \mid !P_B)$$

$$\llbracket P_0 \rrbracket \{c \mapsto c[]\} \emptyset$$

$$= \llbracket \text{let } \dots \rrbracket \{c \mapsto c[], sk_A \mapsto sk_A[], sk_B \mapsto sk_B[]\} \emptyset$$

Example: protocol clauses

$$P_0 = (\nu sk_A)(\nu sk_B) \text{let } pk_A = \text{pk}(sk_A) \text{ in let } pk_B = \text{pk}(sk_B) \text{ in} \\ \bar{c}\langle pk_A \rangle. \bar{c}\langle pk_B \rangle. (!P_A \mid !P_B)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \llbracket P_0 \rrbracket \{c \mapsto c[]\} \emptyset \\ &= \llbracket \text{let } \dots \rrbracket \{c \mapsto c[], sk_A \mapsto sk_A[], sk_B \mapsto sk_B[]\} \emptyset \\ &= \llbracket \bar{c}\langle pk_A \rangle \dots \rrbracket \rho_0 \emptyset \\ &\quad \rho_0 = \{c \mapsto c[], sk_A \mapsto sk_A[], sk_B \mapsto sk_B[], \\ &\quad \quad \quad pk_A \mapsto \text{pk}(sk_A[]), pk_B \mapsto \text{pk}(sk_B[])\} \end{aligned}$$

Example: protocol clauses

$$P_0 = (\nu sk_A)(\nu sk_B) \text{let } pk_A = \text{pk}(sk_A) \text{ in let } pk_B = \text{pk}(sk_B) \text{ in} \\ \bar{c}\langle pk_A \rangle. \bar{c}\langle pk_B \rangle. (!P_A \mid !P_B)$$

$$\llbracket P_0 \rrbracket \{c \mapsto c[]\} \emptyset$$

$$= \llbracket \text{let } \dots \rrbracket \{c \mapsto c[], sk_A \mapsto sk_A[], sk_B \mapsto sk_B[]\} \emptyset$$

$$= \llbracket \bar{c}\langle pk_A \rangle \dots \rrbracket \rho_0 \emptyset$$

$$\rho_0 = \{c \mapsto c[], sk_A \mapsto sk_A[], sk_B \mapsto sk_B[], \\ pk_A \mapsto \text{pk}(sk_A[]), pk_B \mapsto \text{pk}(sk_B[])\}$$

$$= \llbracket !P_A \mid !P_B \rrbracket \rho_0 \emptyset$$

$$\cup \{ \text{mess}(c[], \text{pk}(sk_A[])), \\ \text{mess}(c[], \text{pk}(sk_B[])) \}$$

comes from $\bar{c}\langle pk_A \rangle$

comes from $\bar{c}\langle pk_B \rangle$

Example: protocol clauses

$$P_0 = (\nu sk_A)(\nu sk_B) \text{let } pk_A = \text{pk}(sk_A) \text{ in let } pk_B = \text{pk}(sk_B) \text{ in} \\ \bar{c}\langle pk_A \rangle. \bar{c}\langle pk_B \rangle. (!P_A \mid !P_B)$$

$$\llbracket P_0 \rrbracket \{c \mapsto c[]\} \emptyset$$

$$= \llbracket \text{let } \dots \rrbracket \{c \mapsto c[], sk_A \mapsto sk_A[], sk_B \mapsto sk_B[]\} \emptyset$$

$$= \llbracket \bar{c}\langle pk_A \rangle \dots \rrbracket \rho_0 \emptyset$$

$$\rho_0 = \{c \mapsto c[], sk_A \mapsto sk_A[], sk_B \mapsto sk_B[], \\ pk_A \mapsto \text{pk}(sk_A[]), pk_B \mapsto \text{pk}(sk_B[])\}$$

$$= \llbracket !P_A \mid !P_B \rrbracket \rho_0 \emptyset$$

$$\cup \{ \text{mess}(c[], \text{pk}(sk_A[])), \text{mess}(c[], \text{pk}(sk_B[])) \}$$

comes from $\bar{c}\langle pk_A \rangle$
comes from $\bar{c}\langle pk_B \rangle$

$$= \llbracket P_A \rrbracket \rho_0 \emptyset \cup \llbracket P_B \rrbracket \rho_0 \emptyset \cup \{ \text{attacker}(\text{pk}(sk_A[])), \text{attacker}(\text{pk}(sk_B[])) \}$$

$\text{attacker}(p)$ is equivalent to $\text{mess}(c[], p)$ when $c \in S$, by (Listen) and (Send).

Example: protocol clauses (A)

$$P_A = c(x_{-pk_B}).(\nu k)\bar{c}\langle \text{pencrypt}(\text{sign}(k, sk_A), x_{-pk_B}) \rangle. \\ c(x).\text{let } s = \text{sdecrypt}(x, k) \text{ in } 0$$

$$\llbracket P_A \rrbracket \rho_0 \emptyset$$

$$= \llbracket (\nu k) \dots \rrbracket \rho_0 [x_{-pk_B} \mapsto x_{pk_B}] \text{mess}(c[], x_{pk_B})$$

$$= \llbracket \bar{c}\langle \text{pencrypt}(\dots) \rangle \dots \rrbracket \rho_0 [x_{-pk_B} \mapsto x_{pk_B}, k \mapsto k[x_{pk_B}]] \text{mess}(c[], x_{pk_B})$$

$$= \llbracket c(x) \dots \rrbracket \rho_0 [x_{-pk_B} \mapsto x_{pk_B}, k \mapsto k[x_{pk_B}]] \text{mess}(c[], x_{pk_B}) \\ \cup \{ \text{mess}(c[], x_{pk_B}) \Rightarrow \text{mess}(c[], \text{pencrypt}(\text{sign}(k[x_{pk_B}], sk_A[]), x_{pk_B})) \}$$

$$= \{ \text{mess}(c[], x_{pk_B}) \Rightarrow \text{mess}(c[], \text{pencrypt}(\text{sign}(k[x_{pk_B}], sk_A[]), x_{pk_B})) \}$$

Example: protocol clauses (B)

$$P_B = c(y).let\ y' = pdecrypt(y, sk_B)\ in$$
$$let\ k = checksign(y', pk_A)\ in\ \bar{c}\langle sencrypt(s, k)\rangle$$
$$\llbracket P_B \rrbracket_{\rho_0 \emptyset}$$
$$= \llbracket let\ y' \dots \rrbracket_{\rho_0[y \mapsto y]} \text{mess}(c[], y)$$
$$= \llbracket let\ k \dots \rrbracket_{\rho_0[y \mapsto pencrypt(y', pk(sk_B[])), y' \mapsto y']} \\ \text{mess}(c[], pencrypt(y', pk(sk_B[])))$$
$$= \llbracket \bar{c}\langle \dots \rangle \rrbracket_{\rho_0[y \mapsto pencrypt(sign(k, sk_A[]), pk(sk_B[])), y' \mapsto sign(k, sk_A[]), \\ k \mapsto k]} \text{mess}(c[], pencrypt(sign(k, sk_A[]), pk(sk_B[])))$$
$$= \{ \text{mess}(c[], pencrypt(sign(k, sk_A[]), pk(sk_B[]))) \Rightarrow \\ \text{mess}(c[], sencrypt(s, k)) \}$$

Proof of secrecy

Closed process: P_0

Initial knowledge of the adversary: S finite set of names

Clauses for the protocol and the adversary: $\mathcal{R}_{P_0, S}$.

Theorem

If attacker(s) cannot be derived from $\mathcal{R}_{P_0, S}$,
then P_0 *preserves the secrecy* of s from S .

Theorem

If $\text{deriv}_{\mathcal{R}_{P_0, S}}(\text{attacker}(s))$ is false,
then P_0 *preserves the secrecy* of s from S .

Example

For the Denning-Sacco protocol, attacker(s) is derivable from the clauses.

The derivation corresponds to the description of the known attack.

For the corrected version, attacker(s) is **not derivable** from the clauses:
s is secret.

Demo:

- Denning-Sacco protocol
 - `examplesnd/demosimp/pidenning-sacco-orig`
 - `examplesnd/demosimp/pidenning-sacco-corr-orig`
- Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol
 - `examplesnd/demosimp/pineedham-orig`
 - `examplesnd/demosimp/pineedham-corr-orig`

Comparison with typing [Abadi, Blanchet, POPL'02 and JACM'05]

We have defined a **generic type system** for the explained variant of the spi-calculus.

Theorem

A secrecy property can be proved by the Horn clause verifier

\Leftrightarrow

it can be proved by any instance of the type system.

A **tight relation** between two superficially different frameworks.

Extension to equational theories: Diffie-Hellman

Goal: **Establish a shared key** between two participants

Message 1. $A \rightarrow B : g^{n_0}$ n_0 fresh

Message 2. $B \rightarrow A : g^{n_1}$ n_1 fresh

A computes $k = (g^{n_1})^{n_0}$, B computes $k = (g^{n_0})^{n_1}$.

The exponentiation is such that these quantities are equal.

$$(g^{n_1})^{n_0} = (g^{n_0})^{n_1}$$

The exponentiation is computed in a cyclic multiplicative subgroup G of \mathbb{Z}_p^* , where p is a prime and g is a generator of G .

Extension to equational theories: Diffie-Hellman example

Simplified version of the secure shell protocol (SSH):

Message 1. $C \rightarrow S$: $KExDHInit, g^{n_0}$ n_0 fresh

Message 2. $S \rightarrow C$: $KExDHReply, pk_S, g^{n_1}, \{h\}_{sk_S}$ n_1 fresh

where $K = (g^{n_1})^{n_0} = (g^{n_0})^{n_1}$
and $h = H((pk_S, g^{n_0}, g^{n_1}, K))$.

K and h are shared secrets between C (client) and S (server).

They are used to compute encryption keys.

Extension to equational theories: other examples

- XOR: associative, commutative, $xor(x, x) = 0$, $xor(x, 0) = x$
- Primitives whose success is not observable (for decryption for instance)

$$sdecrypt(sencrypt(x, y), y) = x$$

$$sencrypt(sdecrypt(x, y), y) = x$$

- Subtle interactions between primitives
Example: XOR and crc

$$crc(xor(x, y)) = xor(crc(x), crc(y))$$

Extension to equational theories

We have built algorithms that **translate the equations into a set of rewrite rules**, which generates enough terms (equal modulo the equational theory).
[Blanchet, Abadi, Fournet, JLAP'08]

We have shown that, for each **trace with equations**, there is a corresponding **trace with rewrite rules**, and conversely.

Efficient because it avoids unification modulo.
(Standard syntactic resolution can still be used.)

Still fairly limited, since it leads to non-termination for many equational theories.

(For example, cannot handle theories that contain associativity.)

Equation:

$$(g^x)^y = (g^y)^x$$

is translated into the rewrite rules:

$$g \rightarrow g \quad x^y \rightarrow x^y \quad (g^x)^y \rightarrow (g^y)^x$$

Terms may have **several normal forms**: applying \wedge to g^x and y yields two normal forms of $(g^x)^y$: $(g^x)^y$ and $(g^y)^x$.

Extension to equational theories: encryption

Equations:

$$\text{sdecrypt}(\text{sencrypt}(x, y), y) = x$$

$$\text{sencrypt}(\text{sdecrypt}(x, y), y) = x$$

are translated into the rewrite rules:

$$\text{sdecrypt}(x, y) \rightarrow \text{sdecrypt}(x, y) \quad \text{sencrypt}(x, y) \rightarrow \text{sencrypt}(x, y)$$

$$\text{sdecrypt}(\text{sencrypt}(x, y), y) \rightarrow x \quad \text{sencrypt}(\text{sdecrypt}(x, y), y) \rightarrow x$$

Each term has a single normal form, irreducible by

$$\text{sdecrypt}(\text{sencrypt}(x, y), y) \rightarrow x \text{ and } \text{sencrypt}(\text{sdecrypt}(x, y), y) \rightarrow x.$$

Unification modulo the equational theory could be used, for example to handle associativity and commutativity.

- Better model of **Diffie-Hellman** (modelling the multiplicative group plus the exponentiation).
[Meadows, Narendran, WITS'02]
[Goubault-Larrecq, Roger, Verma, JLAP'04]
- **XOR**
[Comon, Shmatikov, LICS'03]
[Chevalier, Küsters, Rusinowitch, Turuani, LICS'03]
(Bounded number of sessions)

1. A variant of the spi-calculus
2. Intuitive presentation of the Horn clause representation
3. The solving algorithm
4. Experimental results
5. Formal translation from the spi-calculus
6. Extension to correspondences

Authenticity means:

if A thinks he talks to B
then he really talks to B .

Authenticity can be defined by **correspondence assertions**
[Woo and Lam, Oakland'93]:

If A executes $e_A(B)$ (A thinks he talks to B),
then B must have executed $e_B(A)$ (B has started a run with A).

Correspondences: events

Events record that some program point has been reached, with certain values of the variables.

Syntax:

$P, Q ::=$	processes
\dots	
$event(M).P$	event

Semantics:

$$\mathcal{E}, \{event(M).P\} \cup \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{E}, \{P\} \cup \mathcal{P} \quad (\text{Red Event})$$

An S -adversary does not contain events.

Definition

A trace $\mathcal{T} = \mathcal{E}_0, \mathcal{P}_0 \rightarrow^* \mathcal{E}', \mathcal{P}'$ **executes** $event(M)$ if and only if \mathcal{T} contains a reduction $\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{P} \cup \{event(M).P\} \rightarrow \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{P} \cup \{P\}$ for some $\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{P}, P$.

Non-injective correspondences

Intuitive definition

If $event(M)$ has been executed
then $event(M_1), \dots, event(M_n)$ have been executed

Definition

The closed process P_0 **satisfies the correspondence**

$$event(M) \rightsquigarrow \bigwedge_{k=1}^I event(M_k)$$

with respect to S -adversaries if and only if, for any S -adversary Q ,
for any \mathcal{E}_0 containing $fn(P_0) \cup S \cup fn(M) \cup \bigcup_k fn(M_k)$,
for any substitution σ , for any trace $\mathcal{T} = \mathcal{E}_0, \{P_0, Q\} \rightarrow^* \mathcal{E}', \mathcal{P}'$,
if \mathcal{T} executes $\sigma event(M)$,
then there exists σ' such that $\sigma' M = \sigma M$ and,
for all $k \in \{1, \dots, I\}$, \mathcal{T} executes $event(\sigma' M_k)$ as well.

Intuitive definition

Each execution of $event(M)$ corresponds to **distinct** executions of $event(M_1), \dots, event(M_n)$

In this course, we will not go in detail of injective correspondences and will focus on non-injective correspondences.

Example (simplified Woo-Lam public key)

Message 1. $A \rightarrow B : pk_A$

Message 2. $B \rightarrow A : b$ b fresh

Message 3. $A \rightarrow B : \{pk_A, pk_B, b\}_{sk_A}$

$(\nu sk_A)(\nu sk_B)$ let $pk_A = pk(sk_A)$ in let $pk_B = pk(sk_B)$ in
 $\bar{c}\langle pk_A \rangle . \bar{c}\langle pk_B \rangle$.

(A) ! $c(x_{pk_B}) . event(e_A(x_{pk_B})) . \bar{c}\langle pk_A \rangle . c(x_b)$
 $\bar{c}\langle sign((pk_A, x_{pk_B}, x_b), sk_A) \rangle$

(B) | ! $c(x_{pk_A}) . (\nu b) \bar{c}\langle b \rangle . c(m)$
 if $(x_{pk_A}, pk_B, b) = checksign(m, x_{pk_A})$ then
 if $x_{pk_A} = pk_A$ then $event(e_B(pk_B))$

Overview of the proof technique

Our technique **overapproximates** occurrences of events.

Suppose we want to prove a correspondence $\text{event}(e_1(x)) \rightsquigarrow \text{event}(e_2(x))$.

We can overapproximate occurrences of e_1 :

If the correspondence is proved with e_1 overapproximated, then the correspondence still holds in the exact semantics.

We extend the technique for secrecy by introducing a fact **event(p)** which means that $\text{event}(p)$ may have been executed.

If the protocol executes $\text{event}(p)$ after receiving p'_1, \dots, p'_n on channels p_1, \dots, p_n , we generate

$$\text{mess}(p_1, p'_1) \wedge \dots \wedge \text{mess}(p_n, p'_n) \Rightarrow \text{event}(p)$$

Overview of the proof technique (2)

We must **not** overapproximate occurrences of e_2 :

If the correspondence is proved with e_2 overapproximated, we are not sure that e_2 has been executed in the exact semantics, so the correspondence $\text{event}(e_1(x)) \rightsquigarrow \text{event}(e_2(x))$ may actually not hold.

We fix the exact set \mathcal{E} of allowed events $e_2(p)$, and, in order to show $\text{event}(e_1(x)) \rightsquigarrow \text{event}(e_2(x))$, we check that only events $e_1(p)$ for p such that $e_2(p) \in \mathcal{E}$ can be executed.

If we prove this property for all \mathcal{E} , we have proved the desired correspondence.

Overview of the proof technique (3)

We introduce a predicate **m-event**, such that $\text{m-event}(e_2(p))$ is true if and only $e_2(p) \in \mathcal{E}$.

If the protocol outputs p' on channel p after executing the event $e_2(p_0)$ and receiving p'_1, \dots, p'_n on channels p_1, \dots, p_n , we generate

$$\text{mess}(p_1, p'_1) \wedge \dots \wedge \text{mess}(p_n, p'_n) \wedge \text{m-event}(e_2(p_0)) \Rightarrow \text{mess}(p, p')$$

The output of p' on p can be executed only when $\text{m-event}(e_2(p_0))$ is true, that is, $e_2(p_0) \in \mathcal{E}$.

Overview of the proof technique (4)

The resolution will be performed for a fixed but **unknown** value of \mathcal{E} .

We have to keep m-event facts with trying to evaluate them.

To do that, we simply never select m-event facts.

Then the result holds for any \mathcal{E} .

Overview of the proof technique (5)

Difficulty: This reasoning does not work when the correspondence between terms and patterns is not **injective**.

(Otherwise, the true m-event facts will not correspond exactly to the events of the trace.)

With the previous definitions, we do not have injectivity.

To recover injectivity, we need to distinguish names created in different copies of the same process, even after receiving the same messages.

So add one more argument to patterns, a **session identifier**, that is, a variable that takes a different value in each copy of a process.

- Add **session identifiers** to replications:

$!P$ becomes $!^{i \geq n} P$

$!^{i \geq n} P$ means $P\{n/i\} \mid P\{n+1/i\} \mid P\{n+2/i\} \mid \dots$

- Add **patterns (types)** to restrictions:

$(\nu a)P$ becomes $(\nu a:p)P$

Fresh name $a \rightsquigarrow$ **function** $p = a[x_1, \dots, x_n, i_1, \dots, i_{n'}]$ of all variables (in particular inputs and sessions identifiers) bound above a (**skolemization**).

→ distinguish bound names created in different sessions.

Instrumentation of the example

$(\nu sk_A:sk_A[]) (\nu sk_B:sk_B[]) \text{let } pk_A = pk(sk_A) \text{ in let } pk_B = pk(sk_B) \text{ in}$
 $\bar{c}\langle pk_A \rangle. \bar{c}\langle pk_B \rangle.$

(A) $!^{i_A \geq 0} c(x_pk_B). \text{event}(e_A(x_pk_B)). \bar{c}\langle pk_A \rangle. c(x_b).$
 $\bar{c}\langle \text{sign}((pk_A, x_pk_B, x_b), sk_A) \rangle$

(B) | $!^{i_B \geq 0} c(x_pk_A). (\nu b: b[x_pk_A, i_B]) \bar{c}\langle b \rangle. c(m).$
if $(x_pk_A, pk_B, b) = \text{checksign}(m, x_pk_A)$ *then*
if $x_pk_A = pk_A$ *then* $\text{event}(e_B(pk_B))$

Translation pi + crypto \rightarrow Horn clauses

A protocol is translated into a set of **Horn clauses** using
4 predicates:

- mess**(p, p') the message p' may be sent on the channel p
- attacker**(p) the adversary may have p
- m-event**(p) the event $event(p)$ must have been executed
- event**(p) the event $event(p)$ may have executed

Attacker clauses are as before, except that we give an infinite number of names to the attacker: $attacker(b[i])$ instead of $attacker(b[[]])$.

Translation: protocol clauses

ρ : environment (variables, names \mapsto patterns)

h : hypothesis (events that must be executed before reaching the current process)

- $\llbracket M(x).P \rrbracket \rho h = \llbracket P \rrbracket (\rho[x \mapsto x']) (h \wedge \text{mess}(\rho(M), x'))$
 x' new variable
- $\llbracket \overline{M} \langle N \rangle . P \rrbracket \rho h = \llbracket P \rrbracket \rho h \cup \{h \Rightarrow \text{mess}(\rho(M), \rho(N))\}$
- $\llbracket \text{event}(M).P \rrbracket \rho h = \llbracket P \rrbracket \rho (h \wedge \text{m-event}(\rho(M))) \cup \{h \Rightarrow \text{event}(\rho(M))\}$
- $\llbracket !^{i \geq 0} P \rrbracket \rho h = \llbracket P \rrbracket (\rho[i \mapsto i']) h$ i' new variable
- $\llbracket (\nu a : \rho) P \rrbracket \rho h = \llbracket P \rrbracket (\rho[a \mapsto \rho(\rho)]) h$

Example: protocol clauses (initialization)

Process:

$$(\nu sk_A : sk_A[]) (\nu sk_B : sk_B[]) \text{let } pk_A = \text{pk}(sk_A) \text{ in let } pk_B = \text{pk}(sk_B) \text{ in}$$
$$\bar{c}\langle pk_A \rangle . \bar{c}\langle pk_B \rangle \dots$$

Clauses:

$$\text{attacker}(\text{pk}(sk_A[]))$$
$$\text{attacker}(\text{pk}(sk_B[]))$$

Note: $\text{mess}(c, M)$ is equivalent to $\text{attacker}(M)$ because c is public

Example: protocol clauses (for A)

Process:

$$(A) \quad !^{i_A \geq 0} c(x_pk_B). \text{event}(e_A(x_pk_B)). \bar{c}\langle pk_A \rangle. c(x_b). \\ \bar{c}\langle \text{sign}((pk_A, x_pk_B, x_b), sk_A) \rangle$$

Note: clause $\text{attacker}(x_pk_B) \Rightarrow \text{event}(e_A(x_pk_B))$ useless for proving a correspondence $e_B(x) \rightsquigarrow e_A(x)$.

Example: protocol clauses (for A)

Process:

$$(A) \quad !^{i_A \geq 0} c(x_pk_B).event(e_A(x_pk_B)).\bar{c}\langle pk_A \rangle.c(x_b). \\ \bar{c}\langle \text{sign}((pk_A, x_pk_B, x_b), sk_A) \rangle$$

Note: clause $\text{attacker}(x_pk_B) \Rightarrow event(e_A(x_pk_B))$ useless for proving a correspondence $e_B(x) \rightsquigarrow e_A(x)$.

Clauses:

$$\text{attacker}(x_pk_B) \wedge \text{m-event}(e_A(x_pk_B)) \Rightarrow \text{attacker}(\text{pk}(sk_A[]))$$

Example: protocol clauses (for A)

Process:

$$(A) \quad !^i_{A \geq 0} c(x_pk_B).event(e_A(x_pk_B)).\bar{c}\langle pk_A \rangle.c(x_b). \\ \bar{c}\langle sign((pk_A, x_pk_B, x_b), sk_A) \rangle$$

Note: clause $attacker(x_pk_B) \Rightarrow event(e_A(x_pk_B))$ useless for proving a correspondence $e_B(x) \rightsquigarrow e_A(x)$.

Clauses:

$$attacker(x_pk_B) \wedge m\text{-event}(e_A(x_pk_B)) \Rightarrow attacker(pk(sk_A[])) \\ attacker(x_pk_B) \wedge m\text{-event}(e_A(x_pk_B)) \wedge attacker(x_b) \\ \Rightarrow attacker(sign((pk(sk_A[]), x_pk_B, x_b), sk_A[]))$$

Example: protocol clauses (for B)

Process:

$$(B) \quad !^{i_B \geq 0} c(x_pk_A).(\nu b : b[x_pk_A, i_B])\bar{c}\langle b \rangle.c(m). \\ \text{if } (x_pk_A, pk_B, b) = \text{checksign}(m, x_pk_A) \text{ then} \\ \text{if } x_pk_A = pk_A \text{ then event}(e_B(pk_B))$$

Clauses:

$$\text{attacker}(x_pk_A) \Rightarrow \text{attacker}(b[x_pk_A, i_B])$$

Example: protocol clauses (for B)

Process:

$$(B) \quad !i_B \geq 0 \ c(x_pk_A).(\nu b : b[x_pk_A, i_B])\bar{c}\langle b \rangle.c(m). \\ \text{if } (x_pk_A, pk_B, b) = \text{checksign}(m, x_pk_A) \text{ then} \\ \text{if } x_pk_A = pk_A \text{ then } \text{event}(e_B(pk_B))$$

Clauses:

$$\text{attacker}(x_pk_A) \Rightarrow \text{attacker}(b[x_pk_A, i_B]) \\ \text{attacker}(pk(sk_A[])) \wedge \\ \text{attacker}(\text{sign}((pk(sk_A[]), pk(sk_B[]), b[pk(sk_A[]), i_B]), sk_A[])) \\ \Rightarrow \text{event}(e_B(pk(sk_B[])))$$

Proof of correspondences

Closed process: P_0

Instrumentation of P_0 : P'_0

Clauses for the protocol and the adversary: $\mathcal{R}_{P'_0, S}$.

Closed facts defining m-event: $\mathcal{F}_{\text{m-event}}$.

Theorem

Consider any trace \mathcal{T} of P'_0 in the presence of an S -adversary.

Suppose that, if event(p) executed in \mathcal{T} , then $\text{m-event}(p) \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{m-event}}$.

Suppose that event(p') executed in \mathcal{T} .

Then, event(p') derivable from $\mathcal{R}_{P'_0, S} \cup \mathcal{F}_{\text{m-event}}$.

Solving algorithm (for correspondences)

The **selection function** is now:

$$\text{sel}(F_1 \wedge \dots \wedge F_n \Rightarrow F) = \begin{cases} F & \text{if } \forall i \in \{1, \dots, n\}, F_i = \text{attacker}(x) \text{ or } \text{m-event}(p) \\ F_i & \text{different from attacker}(x) \text{ and } \text{m-event}(p) \end{cases}$$

Theorem

F can be derived from $\mathcal{R}_{P'_0, S} \cup \mathcal{F}_{\text{m-event}}$ if and only if it can be derived from $\text{saturate}(\mathcal{R}_{P'_0, S}) \cup \mathcal{F}_{\text{m-event}}$.

Proof of correspondences

Closed process: P_0

Instrumentation of P_0 : P'_0

Clauses for the protocol and the adversary: $\mathcal{R}_{P'_0, S}$.

Theorem

*Consider any trace \mathcal{T} of P'_0 in the presence of an S -adversary.
If $\text{event}(p')$ is executed in \mathcal{T} ,
then there exist a clause $H \Rightarrow C \in \text{saturnate}(\mathcal{R}_{P'_0, S})$ and a substitution σ
such that $\text{event}(p') = \sigma C$ and,
for all $m\text{-event}(p) \in \sigma H$, $\text{event}(p)$ is executed in \mathcal{T} .*

Back to the example

The only clause $R \in \text{saturate}(\mathcal{R}_{P'_0, S})$ that concludes $\text{event}(e_B(\dots))$ is:

$$\text{m-event}(e_A(\text{pk}(sk_B[\]))) \Rightarrow \text{event}(e_B(\text{pk}(sk_B[\])))$$

so we have proved $\text{event}(e_B(x)) \rightsquigarrow \text{event}(e_A(x))$.

Experimental results

Pentium III 1GHz

NS=Needham-Schroeder WL=Woo-Lam	Time (ms)	Cases with attacks	
		A	B
NS public key	25	None	All[Lowe]
NS public key corrected	16	None	None
WL public key	4		All[Durante]
WL public key corrected	6		None
WL shared key (with tags)	6		All[Anderson]
WL shared key corrected (tags)	5		None
Simpler Yahalom, unidirectional	29	Key	None
Simpler Yahalom, bidirectional	101	All[Syverson]	None
Otway-Rees	62	Key[BAN]	Inj, Key[BAN]
Simpler Otway-Rees	10	All[Paulson]	All[Paulson]
Main mode of Skeme	67	None	None

Conclusion: Some other results

- Automatic proof of **strong secrecy** [Blanchet, Oakland'04] and other **observational equivalences** [Blanchet, Abadi, Fournet, LICS'05 and JLAP'08]
- Reconstruction of **attacks** from derivations [Allamigeon, Blanchet, CSFW'05]
- Case studies: Certified email protocol [Abadi, Blanchet, SAS'03], JFK [Abadi, Blanchet, Fournet, ESOP'04], Plutus [Blanchet, Chaudhuri, S&P'08]

Software and papers at www.proverif.ens.fr

Conclusion: Advantages of this technique

- A particularly efficient verifier
- Can handle complex protocols (JFK, ...)
- **Unbounded number of runs** of the protocol
Unbounded message size
⇒ Can be used for **certification** of protocols
- Can prove various **properties**: secrecy, correspondences, observational equivalence
- Can handle a wide range of **cryptographic primitives**, specified by rewrite rules or by equations.

Conclusion: Limitations

- The proofs are done in the Dolev-Yao model. We would like automatic proof of protocols in a **computational setting**. There is a recent tool for that: CryptoVerif.
- The proofs are done on a model of the protocol. We would like automatic proof of **implementations** of protocols (Already some work, for example [Goubault-Larrecq, Parennes, VMCAI'05], [Bhargavan, Fournet, Gordon, Tse, CSFW'06])